Efficient Implementation of ECDH Key Exchange for MSP430-Based Wireless Sensor Networks by Liu, Zhe et al.
Efficient Implementation of ECDH Key Exchange for






















Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) is an indispensable build-
ing block of modern security protocols, and, thus, essential
for secure communication over insecure networks. Despite a
significant body of research devoted to making PKC more
“lightweight,” it is still commonly perceived that software
implementations of PKC are computationally too expensive
for practical use in ultra-low power devices such as wireless
sensor nodes. In the present paper we aim to challenge this
perception and present a highly-optimized implementation
of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the TI MSP430
series of 16-bit microcontrollers. Our software is inspired
by MoTE-ECC and supports scalar multiplication on two
families of elliptic curves, namely Montgomery and twisted
Edwards curves. However, in contrast to MoTE-ECC, we
use pseudo-Mersenne prime fields as underlying algebraic
structure to facilitate inter-operability with existing ECC
implementations. We introduce a novel “zig-zag” technique
for multiple-precision squaring on the MSP430 and assess
its execution time. Similar to MoTE-ECC, we employ the
Montgomery model for variable-base scalar multiplications
and the twisted Edwards model if the base point is fixed
(e.g. to generate an ephemeral key pair). Our experiments
show that the two scalar multiplications needed to perform
an ephemeral ECDH key exchange can be accomplished in
4.88 million clock cycles altogether (using a 159-bit prime
field), which sets a new speed record for ephemeral ECDH
on a 16-bit processor. We also describe the curve generation
process and analyze the execution time of various field and
point arithmetic operations on curves over a 159-bit and a
191-bit pseudo-Mersenne prime field.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the security of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) has been an active area of research, mainly due to
the widespread deployment of WSN technology in critical
application domains like medical monitoring, traffic control
or disaster detection [1]. The wireless nature of communica-
tion among sensor nodes implies that WSNs face the same
security threats as other wireless networks; for example, an
attacker may eavesdrop on the communication, inject false
messages, or replay old messages [17]. In addition, WSNs
can be subject to many other, very specific attacks that are
difficult to defend against [17]. Deploying sensor nodes in
an unattended environment exposes them to attackers who
could tamper with individual nodes or even capture a node
with the goal of extracting sensitive information stored on
it. Strong cryptography is essential to protect stored data
against unauthorized access or to thwart eavesdropping on
the communication between nodes. However, sophisticated
cryptographic algorithms introduce significant overheads in
terms of execution time and energy consumption, which is
undesirable for resource-restricted devices such as wireless
sensor nodes. A state-of-the-art sensor node features an 8
or 16-bit microcontroller clocked at a frequency of less than
10 MHz and is equipped with a few kB of RAM and up to
256 kB of flash memory for storing program code. Despite
these computational constraints, the (by far) most precious
resource of a wireless sensor node is energy. Once deployed
in the field, the sensor nodes are expected to work several
months, or even years, with the energy of two AA batteries
that can not be easily recharged or replaced.
A prerequisite for secure (i.e. encrypted) communication
between two sensor nodes is the establishment of a shared
secret key. Standardized security protocols like SSL or TLS
utilize Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) to set up a shared
key between a client and a server, either through key trans-
port based on RSA or by means of key agreement based on
the Diffie-Hellman scheme. However, due to the restricted
resources of wireless sensor nodes, it was generally believed
that PKC is not feasible for WSNs [1]. Therefore, a large
body of research has been devoted to find more lightweight
approaches for establishing shared keys between nodes, see
e.g. [17] and [12, Section 1.1] for a brief overview. A simple
idea is random key pre-distribution, where, prior to deploy-
ment, each sensor node is loaded with a set of keys chosen
randomly from a large key pool so that any two nodes will
share (at least) one key with a certain probability. While
this approach is fairly easy to implement and preserves the
scarce resources of the nodes (since no costly cryptographic
operations are involved), it has limitations with respect to
scalability and resilience to node capture. Another method
to obtain pairwise secret keys in a WSN is to use a trusted
third party (e.g. the base station) as a key distribution cen-
ter that generates, upon request, a unique “link key” for a
pair of nodes. This approach requires each node to share
a long-term key with the trusted third party, which is used
to transfer the link key securely (i.e. encrypted) to the two
nodes. However, key establishment techniques relying on a
key distribution center require communication among three
parties, possibly over large distances, which is expensive in
terms of energy.
In 2004, Gura et al [7] published a now-classical paper in
which they demonstrated that, in contrast to conventional
wisdom, strong PKC is feasible for small battery-powered
sensor nodes. In particular, they showed that Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) [8], when carefully implemented and
optimized, is computationally less costly than was believed
at that time. For example, a scalar multiplication (which is
the major operation of an ECC cryptosystem) in a 160-bit
elliptic curve group (providing a similar level of security as
1024-bit RSA) can be executed in only 0.81 seconds on an
8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller clocked at 8.0 MHz. The
feasibility of ECC on such resource-restricted sensor nodes
paved the way to another option for key establishment in a
WSN, namely the well-known Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key exchange protocol. ECDH is quite similar to
the traditional Diffie-Hellman protocol, but operates in an
elliptic curve group E(Fq) instead of Z∗p [8]. As mentioned
before, the computationally expensive part of virtually all
ECC schemes, including ECDH, is scalar multiplication, an
operation of the form k · P whereby P is a point of prime
order n on an elliptic curve, and k is simply an integer in
the range [1, n− 1]. There exist two major variants of the
ECDH protocol, namely static and ephemeral ECDH. The
latter yields a unique secret key in each run of the protocol
and, hence, can provide forward secrecy, but this comes at
the cost of an additional scalar multiplication. Ephemeral
ECDH requires each node to execute two scalar multiplica-
tions; one by a fixed base point (to generate an ephemeral
key pair) and the other by a variable base point (to obtain
the shared secret key).
The feasibility of performing ECC on resource-restricted
sensor nodes does not necessarily imply that ECDH is an
attractive option for key establishment in a WSN [23]. Even
though ECDH has clear advantages over other techniques
for key establishment with respect to communication ener-
gy cost, it is still widely believed that scalar multiplication
is too computation-intensive and, therefore, consuming too
much energy for “real-word” WSN applications. To address
this critique, a large body of research has been devoted to
improve the performance of scalar multiplication on 8 and
16-bit microcontrollers with the goal of making ECC more
attractive for resource-restricted environments. Besides the
8-bit ATmega128, also Texas Instruments’ MSP430 series
of low-power microcontrollers [24] has been frequently used
as experimental platform since it can be found in a range
of sensor nodes (e.g. the Tmote Sky). One of the first ECC
software implementations for the TI MSP430 was reported
by Wang et al [25], who achieved an execution time of 25.0
and 28.1 million cycles for a fixed-base and a variable-base
scalar multiplication, respectively, using a Weierstraß curve
over a 160-bit prime field. The by far most important ECC
software for MSP430-based WSNs is TinyECC [13], whose
source code is openly available and has been incorporated
into numerous WSN research projects. TinyECC supports
elliptic curves over 128, 160, and 192-bit primes fields and
is highly scalable and configurable. In the past 5 years, the
majority of research focussed on improving the execution
time of the arithmetic operations in the underlying prime
field, in particular the multiplication; examples for this line
of research are [5, 9, 18, 20, 23, 27]. Only very recently, a
second approach to speed up ECC on the MSP430 platform
has been investigated, namely the use of “special” families
of curves (e.g. Montgomery curves [19] or twisted Edwards
curves [3]) to improve the point arithmetic; representative
papers in this context are [10, 14]. A scalar multiplication
on Curve25519 (a Montgomery curve over a 255-bit prime
field [2]) can be executed in only 9,14 million clock cycles
on an MSP430 with a (16× 16)-bit multiplier [10].
In this paper, we describe an efficient ECC implementa-
tion that achieves record-setting execution times for fixed-
base and variable-base scalar multiplication on an MSP430
processor. We managed to push the performance envelope
through the right selection of curve models (and associated
domain parameters) combined with a careful optimization
of the point/field arithmetic. All previous implementations
of ECC for MSP430 processors used either a conventional
Weierstraß curve (e.g. [20, 23, 27]) or a Montgomery curve
of unreasonably large order (e.g. [10]), both of which wastes
execution time and, thus, energy. In contrast, our software
supports Montgomery and Edwards curves over a 159 and
a 191-bit prime field, which represents a good compromise
between performance and security. Our implementation is
inspired by MoTE-ECC [16], but we use pseudo-Mersenne
prime fields instead of the so-called Optimal Prime Fields
(OPFs) [15] to facilitate inter-operability with other ECC
implementations. We implemented and optimized all field
operations from scratch in Assembly language, whereby we
paid particular attention to the squaring since it was often
ignored in related work. Thanks to our special combination
of curve parameters and efficient point/field arithmetic, we
managed to significantly improve the state-of-the-art.
2. ELLIPTIC CURVES
Ephemeral ECDH requires each of the two sensor nodes
involved in the key exchange to carry out two scalar multi-
plications; one to generate an ephemeral key pair and the
other to get the shared key. The first scalar multiplication
uses a fixed and a-priori-known point as input, namely the
generator G of the elliptic-curve group, whereas the second
scalar multiplication has to be carried out with a random
point not known in advance. Consequently, each of the two
nodes has to perform both a fixed-base and a variable-base
scalar multiplication [8]. Recently, Liu et al [16] introduced
MoTE-ECC, an optimized software library for ECC on the
8-bit AVR platform that allows for very efficient execution
of ephemeral ECDH key exchange in a WSN. MoTE-ECC
uses both the Montgomery model and the twisted Edwards
model, whereby solely the x-coordinates of the public keys
are transferred, as in [2], which reduces the communication
energy cost and makes point compression [8] obsolete. The
fixed-base scalar multiplication is performed on a twisted
Edwards curve, and the variable-base scalar multiplication
on the birationally-equivalent Montgomery curve. In this
way, MoTE-ECC is able to combine the individual compu-
tational advantages of the twisted Edwards model and the
Montgomery model. Our implementation for the MSP430
follows this approach and, thus, we also support both curve
models. In the rest of this section, we first recap the basics
of Montgomery and twisted Edwards curves, and then we
elaborate on the curve generation process.
2.1 Montgomery & Twisted Edwards Curves
In 1987, Peter Montgomery [19] presented a special class
of elliptic curves with unique implementation properties. In
formal terms, a so-called Montgomery curve EM over Fp is
defined through an equation of the form
EM : By
2 = x3 + Ax2 + x, (1)
where A ∈ Fp \ {−2, 2} and B ∈ Fp \ {0}. A characteristic
feature of such curves is that a scalar multiplication can be
executed using only the x-coordinate of the base point and
all intermediate points. The so-called Montgomery ladder is
a special technique for computing Q = k · P that performs
a differential point addition (i.e. an addition of two points
P1, P2 whose difference P1 − P2 is known) and a doubling
in each step. Since the y-coordinate is not involved in the
computation, a differential point addition can be executed
very efficiently with three multiplications (i.e. 3M) and two
squarings (i.e. 2S) in the underlying finite field. Doubling a
point requires two multiplications (i.e. 2M), two squarings
(i.e. 2S), as well as a multiplication by (A − 4)/2, which is
normally a cheap operation when the curve parameter A is
chosen properly [2]. For each bit of the scalar k, the Mont-
gomery ladder has to execute a “ladder step” consisting of a
point addition and a point doubling; both costs 5M and 4S
altogether. Besides efficiency, the Montgomery ladder also
features a highly regular execution pattern, which helps to
thwart certain implementation attacks.
Twisted Edwards curves were introduced by Bernstein et
al in 2008 [3] and are currently considered to be one of the
fastest means to implement ECC. A twisted Edwards curve
ET over a prime field Fp can be defined as
ET : ax
2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2, (2)
where a, d ∈ Fp and ad(a − d) 6= 0. These curves possess a
remarkable addition law that can be complete when a is a
square in Fp and d a non-square. Completeness means the
addition produces the correct result for any two points on
the curve ET , without exception, even if one of the points
is the neutral element O = (0, 1) [3]. Similar to most of the
previous implementations, we adopt the so-called extended
twisted Edwards coordinates introduced in [11], which are
particularly efficient when parameter a = −1. After some
straightforward optimizations of the original formulae from
[11], a mixed point addition can be carried out using seven
multiplications (7M), while three multiplications (3M) and
four squarings (4S) are necessary to double a point. Mixed
here means that one of the points to be added is given in
extended projective coordinates, and the other in extended
affine coordinates. We represent a projective point via the
quintuple (X : Y : E : H : Z), whereby EH = T = XY/Z is
the fourth coordinate from [11]. An extended affine point is
a triple (u : v : w) where u = (x + y)/2, v = (y − x)/2, and
w = dxy. Besides efficiency, twisted Edwards curves have a
second major advantage, namely that scalar multiplication
can be easily made resistant against Simple Power Analysis
(SPA) thanks to the completeness of the addition law.
Bernstein et al formally proved in [3] that every twisted
Edwards curve ET over a non-binary field Fq is birational-
ly equivalent over Fq to a Montgomery curve EM and vice
versa. They also gave a set of formulae for the conversion
of points on ET to points on EM and back.
2.2 Generation of MoTE Curves
A MoTE curve can be described as a Montgomery curve
that is birationally equivalent to a twisted Edwards curve
with a fast and complete addition law [16]. “Fast” in this
context means that we can apply the 7M mixed-addition
formula mentioned above, which is only possible when the
curve parameter a is −1. On the other hand, completeness
of the twisted Edwards addition requires a to be a square
in Fp and d a non-square. Consequently, it is only possible
to have a fast and complete addition law when a = −1 is
a square in the underlying prime field Fp, which is the case
if and only if p ≡ 1 mod 4. In other words, a MoTE curve
can only be generated over a prime field Fp whose order is
congruent to 1 modulo 4 [6, 16]. The authors of the origi-
nal MoTE-ECC paper [16] used so-called Optimal Prime
Fields (OPFs) as underlying algebraic structure, which are
defined by primes of the form p = u · 2k + 1 where u has a
length of up to 16 bits [15]. While such primes are always
congruent to 1 mod 4, they have the disadvantage that the
computation of square roots mod p is costly, which poses a
problem for application scenarios where point compression
is desirable1. A further drawback of OPFs is that, despite
their excellent arithmetic properties (see e.g. [15]), they are
not (yet) widely supported by other ECC implementations
for WSNs. Therefore, and since we want our software to be
suitable for applications that require point compression, we
eventually decided to not use OPFs.
Our ECC software for 16-bit TI MSP430 microcontrollers
employs pseudo-Mersenne prime fields in order to facilitate
inter-operability with other implementations and support a
variety of ECC protocols and applications, including ones
that require point compression. Although we focus only on
ECDH key exchange in this paper, the two MoTE curves
we present in this section are not limited to ECDH but can
1It should be noted that point compression is obsolete in
an “x-coordinate-only” ECDH key exchange as described in
the MoTE-ECC paper [16] and earlier in [2]. The ability to
efficiently de-compress a point is mainly useful for schemes
that need both the x and y coordinate (e.g. signatures).
be used with any other scheme. A pseudo-Mersenne prime
has the form p = 2k − c where c is small enough to fit into
a single register on the target platform, which means c can
be (at most) 16 bits long in our case. In order to achieve
both a complete addition law and fast square-root compu-
tations, we use primes that are congruent to 5 mod 8. Since
p ≡ 5 mod 8 implies p ≡ 1 mod 4, the parameter a = −1 is
clearly a square modulo p. On the other hand, if a prime
p satisfies p ≡ 5 mod 8, it is possible to compute the square
root of an element of Fp in a fairly efficient way using the
method of Atkin [6], which, in essence, costs an exponen-
tiation modulo p. Following the approach of Bernstein from
[2], we adopt primes with a bitlength slightly less than the
“nominal” length, e.g. 159 instead of 160 bits. To be more
concrete, the exponent k of our pseudo-Mersenne primes is
a multiple of 32 minus 1. Using primes that leave one bit
of “headroom” simplifies the implementation of arithmetic
operations modulo p if one aims for both high performance
and some basic resistance against SPA attacks [14]. Once
the exponent k is fixed, a suitable value for c needs to be
determined, which we simply did by choosing the minimal
c so that p = 2k − c is a prime congruent to 5 modulo 8. In
this way, we found the 159-bit prime p = 2159 − 91 and the
191-bit prime p = 2191 − 19.
When generating elliptic curves for cryptographic appli-
cations, one needs to take into account both security and
efficiency requirements. The SafeCurves website [4] defines
a number of criteria a curve has to satisfy to be considered
secure, whereby it distinguishes between ECC security and
ECDLP security. On top of the list of requirements for the
latter is that the group of rational points on a given curve
contains a large subgroup of prime order ` [4]. SafeCurves
requires ` to be at least 2200, in which case computing the
ECDLP is infeasible with today’s technology. However, the
requirement to use groups of such large order contradicts
with the common practice of using groups of order between
2160 and 2192 for WSN applications, see e.g. [13]. This is, in
general, due to the fact that sensor nodes are a low-value
target for cryptanalytic attacks, and, consequently, orders
of about 2160 still provide ample protection for applications
in such areas like home automation. Furthermore, it has to
be taken into account that the ECDLP is almost never the
weakest link in the security of WSNs [17]. In practice, the
most serious vulnerability of sensor nodes is their physical
exposure to attackers along with the lack of tamper resis-
tance. A serious attacker would never attempt to break the
ECDLP in a 160-bit group as he can get the secret key in
a much cheaper way via reverse engineering. Therefore, we
decided to use elliptic curves with orders of about 2160 and
2192; both orders are well established and supported in the
WSN research community.
As specified in [6], the “Montgomery shape” of a MoTE
curve is given by an equation of the form
EM : −(A + 2)y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x, (3)
which means the parameter B = −(A + 2). This contrasts
with the “conventional” approach of using B = 1 as in the
case of e.g. Curve25519 [2]. Choosing a Montgomery curve
with B = −(A+ 2) has the the advantage that such a curve
is “directly” birationally equivalent to a twisted Edwards
curve possessing a fast addition law [11], i.e. to a twisted
Edwards curve with a = −1. Given a Montgomery curve
with parameters A, B as in Equation (1), the parameters
of the birationally-equivalent twisted Edwards curve can be
computed as follows (see [3] for details).
a = (A + 2)/B and d = (A− 2)/B (4)
Therefore, when B = −(A + 2), the curve parameter a we
obtain is a = (A + 2)/(−(A + 2)) = −1, which simplifies
the conversion of points between the Montgomery and the
twisted Edwards shape (see [6] for additional details). On
the other hand, when B = 1, the conversion of a point on
the Montgomery curve to a point on the birationally-equiv-
alent twisted Edwards curve with a = (A + 2)/B and then
from there to an isomorphic twisted Edwards curve of the
form −x2 + y2 = 1 + (−d/a)x2y2 (which allows one to use
the fast 7M addition formula) is more complex and requires
the pre-computation of 1/
√−a as explained in [11, Section
3.1]. The parameter A of the Montgomery form of a MoTE
curve is chosen such that A− 2 is a square and A + 2 is a
non-square in Fp, in which case d = (A− 2)/(−(A + 2)) is
also a non-square (at least if p ≡ 1 mod 4) and the twisted
Edwards addition law is complete. Last, but not least, the
parameter A is congruent to 2 mod 4 to ensure (A+ 2)/4 is
small and a multiplication by (A + 2)/4 can be performed
efficiently. Taking all this and some further considerations
(e.g. twist security) into account, we generated the MoTE
curves P159 and P191, which we specify below. The “P” in
the name of these curves stands for pseudo-Mersenne prime
and the subsequent 3-digit number denotes the bitlength.
MoTE Curve P159
P159 is a MoTE curve over the 159-bit prime field Fp given
by p = 2159 − 91. The Montgomery shape of curve P159 is
defined through the equation
EM159 : −3191568y2 = x3 + 3191566x2 + x (5)
(i.e. A = 3191566 and B = −(A + 2) = −3191568). This
Montgomery curve is birationally equivalent to the twisted
Edwards curve of the form
ET159 : −x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2, (6)
where d = 837225916393474870456088348941705219765626
63492. Curve P159 has an order of q = 4` < p where ` is
a prime slightly smaller than 2157. On the other hand, the
quadratic twist of P159 has an order of q′ = 8`′ > p where
`’ is a prime slightly larger than 2156. In other words, curve
P159 has a co-factor of 4, whereas its quadratic twist has
a co-factor of 8. Both the curve and its twist have a large
embedding degree of above 2100. Moreover, curve P159 has
a large CM field discriminant that fully complies with the
SafeCurves requirements (see [6] for further details).
MoTE Curve P191
P191 is a MoTE curve over the 191-bit prime field Fp given
by p = 2191 − 19. The Montgomery shape of curve P191 is
defined through the equation
EM191 : −2678312y2 = x3 + 2678310x2 + x (7)
(i.e. A = 2678310 and B = −(A + 2) = −2678312). This
Montgomery curve is birationally equivalent to the twisted
Edwards curve of the form
ET191 : −x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2, (8)
where d = 103951507655322023199378042616749966478813
474077612237402. Curve P191 has very similar features as
curve P159 with respect to order (resp. co-factor) of curve
and twist, embedding degree of curve and twist, as well as
CM field discriminant. A more detailed description of this
curve can be found in [6].
3. FIELD ARITHMETIC
Most practical implementations of ECC adopt some kind
of “special” prime fields to speed up the modular reduction
operation; well-known examples are fields whose order is a
Mersenne-like prime, e.g. a generalized or pseudo-Mersenne
prime. In this section, we will focus only on the latter class
of primes. A so-called pseudo-Mersenne prime has the form
p = 2k − c where c is small in relation to 2k; typically, c is
chosen to fit into a register of the target processor. This is
clearly met by the primes p = 2159 − 91 and p = 2191 − 19
from the previous section. The major idea of fast reduction
modulo a pseudo-Mersenne prime p = 2k − c is to utilize
the congruence relation 2k ≡ c mod p repetitively until the
obtained residue has the same bitlength as p. Suppose z is
an integer of a length of l > k bits. At first, z needs to be
split up into a lower part zL comprising the k least signifi-
cant bits of z and an upper part zH that comprises all the
other bits, i.e. we can write z = zH2
k + zL. Now, we have
to substitute 2k by c and get
z = zH2
k + zL ≡ zHc + zL (9)
This new value for z is, of course, in the same residue class
as the original z, but at least k − 1 bits shorter. To obtain
a further reduced result, we simply apply this substitution
repeatedly until z has the same bitlength as p.
The elements of a prime field Fp with p = 2k − c are the
integers from 0 to p − 1, which are at most k bits long. As
usual, we represent the field elements in the form of arrays
of w-bit words, where w corresponds to the word-size of the
target processor, i.e. w = 16 in our case. A k-bit operand
consists of exactly m = dk/we words, which means m = 10
for 159-bit operands and m = 12 for k = 191. We will use
indexed lowercase letters to denote the individual words in
an array, e.g. a ∈ Fp is stored in an m-word array of the
form a = (am−1, . . . , a1, a0) with 0 ≤ ai < 2w where a0 and
am−1 represent the least and most significant w-bit word
of a, respectively. Similar to numerous other ECC software
implementations, e.g. [15], we adopt the idea of incomplete
modular reduction, which means all arithmetic operations
modulo p accept operands that are not fully reduced (and
hence not less than p), as long as they fit into m words. In
our case, the operands can be up to n = mw = k + 1 bits
long because the exponent k of the primes we use is not a
multiple of w but one bit shorter. To give a more concrete
example, the operands of the arithmetic operations modulo
our 159-bit prime can be up to n = 160 bits long and also
the results can have a length of up to 160 bits.
3.1 Addition and Subtraction
An addition of two elements of Fp is, basically, a normal
integer addition, yielding a sum that can be (at most) one
bit longer than the operands, followed by a reduction mod
p. Algorithm 1 shows our implementation of the addition
modulo a k-bit pseudo-Mersenne prime p, whereby we use
a similar notation as in Section 2.2.1 of [8]. The word-wise
additions in line 3 and line 9 are add-with-carry operations
with ε representing the carry bit. As explained above, the
operands a, b do not necessarily need to be smaller than
p, but they must fit into m words, i.e. they can be up to
n = k + 1 bits long. The first part of Algorithm 1 performs
a conventional multiple-precision addition, yielding a sum
of up to n + 1 bits, of which n bits are stored in the words
of s and the final carry bit in ε. In line 5 we combine the
“excess bits” (i.e. ε and the most significant bit of sm−1) in
t, which corresponds to zH in Equation (9). Since the sum
s before reduction is (at most) n + 1 bits long, t can have
a length of two bits, i.e. 0 ≤ t ≤ 3. The next step (line 6)
is to clear the most significant bit of sm−1, after which the
sum s is at most k bits long. Now we multiply t by c, add
the product to s0, and finally propagate the carry up to
sm−1. The result is at most k + 1 bits long because it had
a length of k bits before the addition of t · c. Thus, it can be
used as operand in another field operation. Note that the
modular addition in Algorithm 1 has a constant execution
time as it does not contain any conditional statements.
Algorithm 1. Addition modulo a pseudo-Mersenne prime
Input: Two m-word operands a = (am−1, . . . , a0) and b =
(bm−1, . . . , b0), and a prime of the form p = 2k − c.
Output: Modular sum s = a + b mod p = (sm−1, . . . , s0).
1: (ε, s0)← a0 + b0
2: for i = 1 to m− 1 do
3: (ε, si)← ai + bi + ε
4: end for
5: t← (ε 1) + (sm−1  15) { 0 ≤ t ≤ 3}
6: sm−1 ← sm−1 & 0x7fff { clear the MSB of sm−1}
7: (ε, s0)← t · c + s0 {main step of reduction}
8: for i = 1 to m− 1 do
9: (ε, si)← si + ε
10: end for
11: return s
A subtraction in Fp can be performed in a similar way as
the modular addition described above. To prevent negative
results, we execute the subtraction s = a− b mod p via an
operation of the form s = 3p + a− b mod p. Since we use
pseudo-Mersenne primes, the addition of 3p does not cause
much overhead due to the fact that most words of 3p have
the same value, namely 2w − 1, and so they do not need to
be loaded from memory. The reduction step can be done in
exactly the same way as described above.
3.2 Multiplication and Squaring
Multiplication and squaring in Fp are in general the two
most performance-critical field operations performed in the
course of a scalar multiplication [8]. When using a pseudo-
Mersenne prime, it is common practice to do the reduction
mod p after the multiplication instead of executing them in
an interleaved fashion as in [15]. Also our implementation
for the MSP430 follows this basic approach. Some MSP430
models feature a memory-mapped hardware multiplier able
to execute (16 × 16)-bit multiply and multiply-accumulate
operations on both signed and unsigned integers [24]. Since
the multiplier is a memory-mapped peripheral, it has to be
accessed by writing the two operands to specific locations
in memory. Concretely, the first operand of a multiply or a
MAC operation has to be written to one of four addresses
(MPY, MPYS, MAC, or MACS) and this address determines the
actual operation to be issued. The second operand must be
written to another specific address (OP2), and once this has
happened, the selected operation is immediately executed
[24]. After a few clock cycles, the 32-bit result is available
at the addresses RESLO (lower 16 bits) and RESHI (upper 16
bits). In the case of a MAC operation, the product of the
two operands is added to the content of RESHI|RESLO and
the obtained cumulative sum is written back to RESHI and
RESLO [24]. The carry bit produced by the accumulation is
written to another address, namely SUMEXT. When several
multiplications with one and the same operand need to be
carried out, it is possible to “re-use” this operand, provided
that it is the first operand. Namely, the first operand can
be used in consecutive multiplications or consecutive MAC
operations without having to write it again to one of the
four addresses that select the type of operation.
Multiple-Precision Multiplication
Most ECC implementations for the MSP430 platform use
the so-called product-scanning technique (or an optimized
variant of it) to perform multi-precision multiplication, see
e.g. [5, 21, 22]. The product-scanning method computes the
product of two multiple-precision integers in a column-wise
fashion and performs MAC operations in its loops, i.e. two
w-bit words are multiplied and the 2w-bit product is added
to a cumulative sum. Hence, the product-scanning method
performs well on MSP430 processors. Our implementation
is also based on product scanning, but we incorporated a
number of low-level optimizations. For example, we use all
free registers to “cache” 16-bit words of the operands so as
to minimize the number of memory accesses. Moreover, we
adapt the order in which the partial products are processed
with the goal of increasing the number of subsequent MAC
operations that can use one and the same operand. In this
way, we can save a few clock cycles as the re-used operand
has to be written to MAC only once. Listing 1 shows a code
snippet that illustrates the computation of the first two
partial products of a column. The MOV instructions in line
1 and 2 write two operand words (which are accessed via
the pointers APTR and BPTR) to MAC and OP2. As explained
above, the 32-bit result of a MAC operation is placed in
RESHI and RESLO, while the carry from the accumulation is
written to SUMEXT. In line 3 and 7, the carry bit is added
into a register named CARRY. More precisely, the carry from
the first MAC operation of a column can be directly moved
to CARRY, while subsequent carries need to be added.
1: MOV @APTR+, &MAC
2: MOV @BPTR , &OP2
3: MOV &SUMEXT , CARRY
4: SUB #2, BPTR
5: MOV @APTR+, &MAC
6: MOV @BPTR , &OP2
7: ADD &SUMEXT , CARRY
8: SUB #2, BPTR
Listing 1: Product-scanning technique using MAC
operations
Multiple-Precision Squaring
Since squaring received rather modest attention in previous
work (and was completely ignored in e.g. [18]), it bears the
potential for noticeable speed-ups through optimization. In
essence, squaring is a special case of multiplication since all
partial products of the form ai · aj with i 6= j appear twice
in the result due to the fact that ai · aj = aj · ai. Dedicated
squaring techniques compute these partial products once
and then double them, which reduces the number of word-
level multiplication or MAC operations by nearly 50%. The
squaring routine we implemented involves two steps; in the
first step, all partial products to be doubled are generated
and summed up. Then, in the second step, the intermediate
result obtained so far is doubled and the partial products
from the “‘main diagonal” (i.e. the partial products that are
themselves squares of the form ai · ai) are added to yield
the full result. The first step can be optimized in the same
way as the multi-precision multiplication, which means we
should use free registers to “cache” operand words and we
should re-order the processing of partial products with the
goal of executing a number of consecutive MAC operations
with the same first operand. For example, once a0 has been
written to address MAC, we can process the partial products
a0 · a2 and a0 · a3 by only writing a2 and a3 to OP2.
a 0· a 0
z 0
a 9· a 0
a 9· a 9
z 9z 18 z 1z 2
Figure 1: Zig-zag squaring of a 160-bit integer
1: CLR R15
2: MOV R15 , &RESLO
3: MOV R15 , &RESHI
4: // A[0]*A[1]
5: MOV @APTR , &MAC
6: MOV @APTR2+, &OP2
7: MOV &RESLO , 2(R14)
8: MOV &RESHI , &RESLO
9: MOV R15 , &RESHI
10: // A[0]*A[2]
11: MOV @APTR2+, &OP2
12: MOV &RESLO , 4(R14)
13: MOV &RESHI , &RESLO
14: MOV R15 , &RESHI
15: // A[0]*A[3]
16: MOV @APTR2+, &OP2
Listing 2: Zig-zag squaring using MAC operations
Taking all these optimization strategies into account, we
found that the most efficient way to perform the first step
is to process the partial products in a “zig-zag” fashion as
illustrated by the thick yellow line in Figure 1. We call this
approach “zig-zag squaring” because it is somewhat related
to the zig-zag multiplication described in [27]. Each dot in
Figure 1 represents one partial product. The computation
starts at the right corner and proceeds to the left. Both the
first column on the yellow line (i.e. the column yielding the
word z1 of z = a
2) and the second column (z2) consist of a
single partial product each, namely a0 · a1 and a0 · a2, while
the third column (producing the word z3) contains the two
partial products a0 · a3 and a1 · a2. Listing 2 demonstrates
the computation of the first three partial products on the
yellow line, whereby this code snippet shows that a0 needs
to be written to the address MAC only once and can then be
used as operand in three MAC operations. The first three
partial products (i.e. a0 · a1, a0 · a2, and a0 · a3) allow some
special optimizations as their accumulation into RESLO and
RESHI can not cause an overflow, i.e. SUMEXT is 0 and does
not need to be added to register CARRY. This also simplifies
the w-bit right-shift of the cumulative sum, which has to
be performed at the end of each column in order to ensure
a proper alignment of the partial products. The white dots
in Figure 1 indicate all partial products that do not require
a carry propagation. When the first step of the squaring is
completed, the intermediate result has to be doubled and
the partial products located on the red line at the bottom
of Figure 1 (i.e. a0 · a0 to a9 · a9) must be added, which can
be done together with the doubling in one pass.
Modular Reduction
Since the operands of a multiplication or squaring may be
incompletely reduced, the resulting product or square has
a length of up to 2n = 2k + 2 bits, but nonetheless always
fits into 2m words. Our implementation of the reduction is
fully optimized for pseudo-Mersenne primes p = 2k − c and
consists of two steps. Let z be a 2m-word product. In the
first step, z is split into an upper part zH that comprises
the m most significant words and a lower part zL with all
the other words. At the beginning of this section we defined
the exponent k of our primes to be a multiple of 32 minus
1, which implies that k is a multiple of w minus 1. Thus, we
have 2p = 2(2k − c) = 2n − d where n = k + 1 = mw and
d = 2c. Given z = zH · 2mw + zL, the first reduction step is
to compute z′ ≡ z mod p as follows
z′ = zH · d + zL (10)
Taking our 159-bit prime p = 2159 − 91 as an example, we
have d = 2c = 182. Since the two operands to be multiplied
must be less than 2160 each, it can be shown that z′ has a
maximum length of 168 bits and fits into 11 words. Using
2p instead of p in the first reduction step allows us to avoid
shift operations, which would otherwise be necessary since
k is not a multiple of the word size. The second step of the
reduction operation is the same as in the modular addition
(i.e. line 5 to 10 in Algorithm 1), except that the variable
t has to be composed of z′m (shifted one bit to the left) and
the MSB of z′m−1. More formally, t = z
′/2k, which means
t has a length of 9 bits in our 159-bit example. The product
t · c has a length of 16 bits, and, consequently, the result we
get after the second reduction step is at most 160 bits as in
the modular addition.
3.3 Fermat-Based Inversion
Using projective coordinates for the point arithmetic has
the advantage that only a single inversion in Fp needs to be
executed, namely at the very end of a scalar multiplication
to convert the result from projective to affine coordinates
[8]. There exist two principal approaches for performing an
inversion in Fp, namely the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
(EEA) and inversion via exponentiation based on Fermat’s
little theorem. The EAA is, in general, more efficient than
Fermat’s technique, but has an irregular execution pattern
and an operand-dependent execution time, both of which is
problematic if one aims for resistance against side-channel
attacks. Therefore, we implemented the inversion by means
of an exponentiation of the form a = z−1 ≡ zp−2 mod p. In
order to minimize the number of modular multiplications
needed for this exponentiation, we use an addition-chain as
shown in Algorithm 2 for our 159-bit prime. The comments
in each line specify the computational cost of the operation
carried out in that line, i.e. the number of multiplications
(M) and squarings (S). Also given is the intermediate value
of the exponent based on all operations executed until that
line. In total, an inversion modulo our 159-bit prime costs
158 squarings and 11 multiplications.
Algorithm 2. Fermat-based inversion mod p = 2159 − 91
Input: Integer a satisfying 1 ≤ a ≤ p− 1.
Output: Inverse z = ap−2 mod p = a−1 mod p.
1: a2 ← a2 { exp: 2, cost: 0M+1S}
2: a3 ← a2 · a { exp: 3, cost: 1M+0S}
3: a15 ← (a3)22 · a3 { exp: 15, cost: 2S+1M}
4: t1 ← (a15)24 · a15 { exp: 28 − 1, cost: 4S+1M}
5: t2 ← (t1)28 · t1 { exp: 216 − 1, cost: 8S+1M}
6: t3 ← (t2)216 · t2 { exp: 232 − 1, cost: 16S+1M}
7: t4 ← (t3)232 · t3 { exp: 264 − 1, cost: 32S+1M}
8: t5 ← (t4)264 · t4 { exp: 2128 − 1, cost: 64S+1M}
9: t6 ← ((t5)216 · t2)28 · t1 { exp: 2152 − 1, cost: 24S+2M}
10: z ← ((t6)22 · a)25 · a3 { exp: 2159 − 93, cost: 7S+2M}
11: return z
A Fermat-based inversion modulo p = 2191 − 19 can be
performed in a similar fashion using an optimized addition
chain, whereby the overall computational cost amounts to
190 modular squarings and 12 modular multiplications.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Ephemeral ECDH key exchange requires each of the two
involved nodes to perform a fixed-base and a variable-base
scalar multiplication. Since our implementation is based on
MoTE curves, we can execute the former with a fixed-base
comb method (using the twisted Edwards model), whereas
the second scalar multiplication can take advantage of the
existence of a birationally-equivalent Montgomery model
and its high efficiency in variable-base scenarios. Similar to
Curve25519 [2], we exchange only the x-coordinates of the
ephemeral public keys. Thus, it is necessary to convert the
point obtained as result of the first scalar multiplication to
a point on the equivalent Montgomery curve. This can be
done in combination with the projective-affine conversion
so that only one inversion is necessary for both conversions
(see [16] for the conversion formulae).






Table 1: Execution time (in clock cycles) of field
arithmetic operations.
We determined the execution time of various arithmetic
operations with help of the cycle-accurate simulator that is
part of IAR Embedded Workbench 6.10 using the F1611 as
target device. Table 1 summarizes the results of the field
Implementation Field Mul Fixed SM Variab SM Full ECDH Regular Device
Implementations using curves over a 159 or 160-bit prime field
Liu and Ning [13] n/a 12,645,000 12,645,000 25,290,000 No MSP430F1611
Marin et al [18] 6,293 10,020,000 10,020,000 20,040,000 No n/a
Wenger and Werner [27] 3,112 8,779,931 8,779,931 17,559,862 n/a MSP430F1611
Hinterwa¨lder et al [9] 2,266 6,312,785 6,312,785 12,625,570 No MSP430F2618
Szczechowiak et al [23] 2,736 5,760,000 5,760,000 11,520,000 No MSP430F1611
Wenger [26] 1,905 5,721,420 5,721,420 11,442,840 Yes MSP430C11x1
Gouveˆa and Lo´pez [5] 1,952 1,831,063 4,417,661 6,248,724 No n/a
This work (curve P159) 1,828 1,635,056 3,248,819 4,883,875 Yes MSP430F1611
Implementations using curves over a 191 or 192-bit prime field
Wenger and Werner [27] n/a 11,949,000 11,949,000 23,898,000 n/a MSP430F1611
Wenger [26] 2,559 9,100,128 9,100,128 18,200,256 Yes MSP430C11x1
This work (curve P191) 2,555 2,604,338 5,121,517 7,725,855 Yes MSP430F1611
Table 3: Execution times (in clock cycles) of our ECC software and some previous implementations.
arithmetic for both of our prime fields. For example, a full
multiplication (including reduction) in our 159-bit field has
an execution time of just 1828 clock cycles, which improves
the 160-bit multiplication times in [5] and [26] by 124 and
77 cycles, respectively. An execution time of 1828 cycles
is, to our knowledge, the best result for multiplication in a
prime field of about 160 bits ever reported in the literature
and, therefore, represents a new speed record. Squaring in
our 159-bit prime field is approximately 18% faster than a
multiplication, whereas the Fermat-based inversion has an
execution time of roughly 147 multiplications. Note that all
field operations listed in Table 1 have a regular execution
profile and a constant execution time, independent of the
actual value of the operands, which helps to thwart certain
implementation attacks.
Operation 159 bit 191 bit
TE Point Add. 14,685 19,852
TE Point Dbl. 13,263 17,514
Mon Point Add. 10,276 13,586
Mon Point Dbl. 8,183 10,733
Table 2: Execution time (in clock cycles) of point
addition and point doubling.
We implemented the point arithmetic (i.e. point addition
and doubling) in C, whereby we used Assembly functions
for the field operations as subroutines. The execution times
for the Montgomery shape and the twisted Edwards shape
on both curve P159 and P191 are specified in Table 2. As
expected, the point arithmetic on the Montgomery curve is
faster than that on the twisted Edwards curve, mainly due
to the fact that the differential point addition/doubling on
a Montgomery curve does not involve the y coordinate. In
summary, the simulation results in Table 2 agree with the
number of field multiplications and squarings as analyzed
in Subsection 2.1. A fixed-base scalar multiplication using
the twisted Edwards model of MoTE curve P159 requires
approximately 1.635 · 106 cycles on the MSP430F1611. We
perform a fixed-base scalar multiplication via a fixed-base
comb method with 8 pre-computed multiples of the base
point so that four bits of the scalar can be processed at a
time. A detailed description of this comb method, which is
highly regular and has constant (i.e. operand-independent)
execution time, can be found in [16]. As mentioned at the
outset of this section, the fixed-base scalar multiplication
also includes the conversion of the obtained point from the
twisted Edwards curve to the birationally-equivalent Mont-
gomery curve, on which the second scalar multiplication is
performed. However, since this second scalar multiplication
is variable-base, we use the Montgomery ladder to execute
it in an efficient fashion. Taking curve P159 as example, the
second (i.e. variable-base) scalar multiplication executes in
3.249 · 106 cycles, which means the total computation time
of ephemeral ECDH amounts to 4.884 · 106 cycles.
Table 3 compares our work with previous ECC software
implementations for MSP430 devices in terms of execution
time of a field multiplication (second column), a fixed-base
scalar multiplication (third column), a variable-base scalar
multiplication (fourth column), and an ECDH key exchange
(fifth column). Also specified is whether an implementation
features a regular execution profile (sixth column) and the
specific device (seventh column). Our implementations on
both curve P159 and curve P191 significantly improve the
state-of-the-art; for example, ECDH on curve P159 outper-
forms the best previous implementation (i.e. [5]) by more
than 21.84%. However, it should be taken into account in
this comparison that most of the previous implementations
only considered variable-base scalar multiplication.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a high-speed implementation of ephemeral
ECDH key exchange based on MoTE elliptic curves for the
MSP430 family of microcontrollers. Our software exploits
the birational equivalence between the Montgomery model
and the twisted Edwards model of a MoTE curve with the
goal of maximizing the performance of both fixed-base and
variable-base scalar multiplication. In the case of a MoTE
curve over a 159-bit pseudo-Mersenne prime, a fixed-base
scalar multiplication (using the twisted Edwards form and
eight pre-computed points) takes 1.635 · 106 cycles on an
MSP430F1611, while a variable-base scalar multiplication
on the birationally-equivalent Montgomery curve requires
3.249 · 106 clock cycles. Consequently, both scalar multipli-
cations can be executed in only 4.884 ·106 cycles, which sets
a new speed record for the computation of an ephemeral
ECDH key exchange on the MSP430 platform and improves
the previously best result in the literature by 21,84%. We
achieved this performance gain through a careful selection
of curve models and domain parameters, aiming for a good
balance between security and efficiency, combined with a
highly-optimized implementation of the low-level field and
group arithmetic.
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